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Abstract 
Theory and research regarding moral motivation has focused for decades 
on the roles of moral reasoning and, to some extent, moral emotion. Re-
cently, however, several models of morality have positioned identity as an 
additional important source of moral motivation. An individual has a moral 
identity to the extent that he or she has constructed his or her sense of self 
around moral concerns (e.g., moral values). This paper reviews theory and 
research linking moral identity to moral behavior and commitment. Addi-
tionally, it suggests several key unanswered questions about moral identity 
and provides recommendations for future research. 
Keywords: Moral development, Moral identity, Moral motivation 
In the last century, numerous theories of moral functioning have been 
proposed, each with its own assumptions about what motivates moral 
action. One of the first and most influential theories of morality, Kohl-
berg’s [1969] cognitive developmental theory, focused largely on the 
role of moral reasoning. In contrast, Hoffman’s [1970] moral social-
ization theory emphasized moral emotion. More recently, some schol-
ars have suggested that moral motivation is more fully understood by 
considering the role of the self in morality, often termed moral self or 
moral identity [Hart, in press; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004a]. For exam-
ple, Blasi [1995] suggests that in moral identity, moral concerns (e.g., 
moral principles, goals, and commitments) are ‘integrated with one’s 
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motivational and emotional systems; are made the object of agentic 
processes, including responsibility; and are finally taken as a basis 
for the construction of one’s self-concept and identity’ (pp 233– 234). 
Others have posited that moral identity entails the unity of self and 
moral systems [Colby & Damon, 1992], and involves ‘[having] an ex-
plicit theory of yourself as a moral agent – as one who acts on the ba-
sis of respect and/or concern for the rights and/or welfare of others’ 
[Moshman, 2005, p. 121]. 
Scholars are increasingly convinced that identity may play an im-
portant part in moral functioning, but links between identity and mo-
rality remain unclear, both conceptually and empirically. Hence, the 
purpose of this paper is to assess the current state of the literature 
regarding moral identity, as well as to suggest future directions that 
may move the field forward in being able to more fully understand 
moral motivation. Specifically, we will first make an argument for 
the importance of exploring the role of identity in moral function-
ing. Second, we will suggest Blasi’s [1983, 1984, 1995] moral identity 
model as a promising start for understanding links between identity 
and morality. Third, we will review empirical research on moral iden-
tity. Lastly, we will outline critical questions that should be addressed 
regarding moral identity and suggest directions for how to best ap-
proach these issues. 
Moral Motivation: A Theoretical Review 
Moral Reasoning and Moral Emotion as Sources of Moral Motivation 
In the late 1950s, Lawrence Kohlberg constructed his highly influential 
Cognitive-Developmental Theory of morality [Kohlberg, 1969]. Kohl-
berg assumed that moral principles, when understood, would inher-
ently motivate moral action. He posited that, as moral reasoning de-
velops, individuals become more prone to utilize moral principles in 
making judgments in moral situations. At higher stages of moral rea-
soning, moral principles and their universal and prescriptive nature 
become more salient; as a result, individuals feel more compelled to 
behave consistent with their moral judgments. The motivation for 
moral action, then, stems directly from moral understanding; other 
facets of morality, such as emotion, play minor roles in this process. 
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Many contemporary approaches to morality stemming from Kohl-
berg’s theory, such as Social Domain Theory [Turiel, 2002], similarly 
emphasize the role of cognition in moral functioning. 
In contrast to cognitive approaches, Martin Hoffman outlined a 
theory focused on the role of moral emotion in morality [Hoffman, 
1970, 2000]. Moral emotion is seen as the primary source of moral 
motivation. Specifically, 
(…) abstract moral principles, learned in ‘cool’ didactic con-
texts (lectures, sermons), lack motive force. Empathy’s con-
tribution to moral principles is to transform them into pro-
social hot cognitions – cognitive representations charged with 
empathic affect, thus giving them motive force. [Hoffman, 
2000, p. 239] 
So, while moral understanding helps focus and direct moral emo-
tion, it is emotion that provides the motivating ‘spark’ that leads to 
action. Some other scholars also emphasize the role of emotion, al-
though to a lesser extent than Hoffman [e.g., Eisenberg, 1986].  
Most approaches to morality acknowledge the role of moral cogni-
tion and moral emotion in moral motivation, but differ in their stance 
on which is primary in the process of motivating moral behavior. Fur-
ther, some more integrative perspectives suggest that moral cognition 
and moral emotion are interlinked, and that both can function as pri-
mary sources of moral motivation [e.g., Eisenberg, 1986; Gibbs, 2003]. 
This is more in line with research indicating the interconnected and 
inseparable nature of moral cognition and moral emotion [Damasio, 
1994; Eisenberg, Shea, Carlo, & Knight, 1991]. However, there are con-
ceptual and empirical reasons to question whether moral understand-
ing and moral emotion, even when considered jointly, can adequately 
account for the motivation of moral action. 
Conceptually, although moral cognitive-emotional sources of mo-
tivation can motivate moral action in some individuals in some situa-
tions, they cannot alone account for extraordinary moral action, con-
sistent moral behavior, and enduring moral commitment. For this, 
it seems there might be moderating factors between moral cogni-
tive-emotional motivation sources and moral action. As some schol-
ars suggest [e.g., Eisenberg, 1986; Rest, 1983], in any given situation 
there are multiple motives compelling the individual towards differ-
ent courses of action. A moral cognitive-emotional motive, then, will 
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likely be just one of several motives in a moral situation. Ultimately, 
the individual decides which of these motives to act on. Thus, he or 
she can choose whether or not to follow moral cognitive-emotional 
motives; the mere presence of these motives does not guarantee moral 
action will result. In fact, it is easy to conceptualize situations where 
individuals may know the right thing to do, feel emotionally prompted 
to take the moral course of action, but decide to do otherwise. Hence, 
moderators may exist that affect the relative importance of moral cog-
nitive-emotional motives. 
Empirically, research has generally shown moral reasoning [Blasi, 
1980] and moral emotion [Eisenberg & Miller, 1987] to be positively 
associated with moral action, but only moderately. Thus, moral cogni-
tive-emotional motives do not fully account for moral action; there is 
significant variability in moral behavior left unexplained. Given mod-
erate relations between moral reasoning and action, Blasi [1980] be-
came skeptical of Kohlberg’s notion that moral judgment is directly 
linked to moral action, and urged scholars to search for potential mod-
erating factors. The same can be said for links between moral emo-
tion and moral action. 
Identity as a Source of Moral Motivation 
In addition to moral understanding and moral emotion, some scholars 
have suggested that identity may play a role in motivating moral ac-
tion [e.g., Blasi, 1983; Colby & Damon, 1992; Eisenberg, 1986; Gibbs, 
2003; Hoffman, 2000; Kohl-berg & Candee, 1984; Krebs & Van Hes-
teren, 1994; Monroe, 2001; Narvaez & Lapsley, in press; Nisan, 2004; 
Rest, 1983; Schwartz & Howard, 1982]. The various models proposed 
by these theorists are unified in suggesting that when morality is im-
portant and central to one’s sense of self and identity, it heightens 
one’s sense of obligation and responsibility to live consistent with 
one’s moral concerns. Some also emphasize how the self-importance 
of morality is linked to the relative prioritization of moral values in 
one’s value system, which impacts the likelihood of moral values be-
ing acted upon in moral situations [e.g., Blasi, 1983; Eisenberg, 1986; 
Narvaez & Lapsley, in press; Rest, 1983; Schwartz & Howard, 1982]. 
Further, identity is seen by some as a supplemental source of moral 
motivation that provides a boost beyond the motivation available from 
moral understanding and moral emotion alone; in this sense, it is 
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useful in explaining extraordinary moral action and enduring moral 
commitment [e.g., Blasi, 1983; Colby & Damon, 1992; Eisenberg, 1986; 
Gibbs, 2003; Hoffman, 2000]. 
Although several models of morality position a role for identity, 
Blasi’s model of moral identity includes the most elaborated concep-
tion of identity [Blasi, 1988, 1993, 2004a; Blasi & Glodis, 1995], and 
the most detailed linkages between identity and moral functioning 
[Blasi, 1984, 1993, 1995, 2004b]. Thus Blasi’s explanation of moral 
identity has been the most extensive and has yielded the most insight 
regarding mechanisms underlying moral identity as a source of moral 
motivation. While identity is central to Blasi’s understanding of mo-
rality, in the models proposed by most other scholars it is more of an 
appendage [e.g., Eisenberg, 1986; Gibbs, 2003; Hoffman, 2000; Kohl-
berg & Candee, 1984; Krebs & Van Hesteren, 1994; Narvaez & Lapsley, 
in press; Rest, 1983]. Most other models emphasize the role of other 
facets of morality, such as moral understanding [Gibbs, 2003; Kohl-
berg & Candee, 1984; Krebs & Van Hesteren, 1994; Rest, 1983], moral 
emotion [Gibbs, 2003; Hoffman, 2000], and moral schemas [Narvaez 
& Lapsley, in press], and only minimally explicate the role of moral 
identity. Further, when discussing the place of identity in moral func-
tioning, most other models of morality either draw on Blasi’s model 
[e.g., Colby & Damon, 1992; Eisenberg, 1986; Gibbs, 2003; Kohlberg 
& Candee, 1984; Krebs & Van Hesteren, 1994; Monroe, 2001; Narvaez 
& Lapsley, in press; Nisan, 2004; Rest, 1983] or present ideas largely 
consistent with Blasi’s [e.g., Hoffman, 2000; Schwartz & Howard, 
1982]. Thus, we will use Blasi’s ideas as a framework for our discus-
sion of links between moral identity and moral action. 
Blasi’s Model of Moral Identity 
In an attempt to fill the gap between moral understanding and moral 
action left by Kohlberg’s theory, Blasi [1983] proposed his Self Model 
of moral functioning. This model has three key components. First, be-
fore leading to moral action, a moral judgment can also pass through 
a judgment of responsibility, such that ‘an action, evaluated as moral, 
is also judged to be strictly necessary for the individual’ [Blasi, 1983, 
p. 198]. Hence, a person might not only decide the ‘right’ or ‘moral’ 
way to proceed in a given situation, but might also assess whether or 
not he or she feels responsible for acting on that judgment. Second, 
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the criteria for judgments of responsibility often stem from the struc-
ture of an individual’s self. More specifically, what Blasi called moral 
identity reflects individual differences in the extent to which being 
moral is a central or essential characteristic of the sense of self. The 
third component of the Self Model is self-consistency. Blasi suggested 
there is a natural human tendency to want to live consistent with one’s 
sense of self; hence, when one’s self is centered on moral concerns, 
this inclination serves as a key motivating force for moral action. In 
summary, Blasi postulated that moral judgments might more reliably 
predict moral behavior if they are filtered through responsibility judg-
ments based on moral identity, and propelled into action via the ten-
dency toward self-consistency. 
More recently Blasi [1993, 2004a; Blasi & Glodis, 1995] has elabo-
rated ideas about the structure of identity that can help us understand 
the role of identity in morality. He posited there are ‘two aspects that 
make up a concrete identity, namely the specific contents around which 
one’s sense of self is constructed (moral ideals are one such content) 
and the modes in which identity is subjectively experienced, seem to 
be largely independent of each other, though not exactly orthogonal’ 
[Blasi, 1993, p. 117]. Thus, similar to James’ [1961/1892] notion of the 
me and the I, Blasi is calling attention to both an objective (identity 
content) and a subjective (identity experience) side of identity.  
As subjective identity matures, several important changes occur 
[Blasi, 1988, 2001, 2004a; Blasi & Glodis, 1995; Blasi & Oresick, 1987]. 
The sense of self becomes based more on internal, psychological iden-
tity contents, such as values and goals, rather than external identity 
contents such as physical characteristics, relationships, and behav-
iors. Additionally, the self becomes more organized and unified. An 
important part of this is the hierarchical organization of identity con-
tents such that some are chosen as more central and essential to one’s 
sense of self than others. Subjective identity maturity also entails an 
increasing sense of agency over one’s self, such that the identity con-
tents one cares most about are actively appropriated into one’s core 
self. This is coupled with a heightened sense of possession or owner-
ship over one’s identity, such that one feels responsible for protect-
ing his or her identity and actualizing it in daily life. In other words, 
with mature subjective identity there is a greater desire for self-con-
sistency; fidelity with one’s core self is seen as a necessity, and self-
inconsistency elicits intense negative affect. 
H a r dy  &  C a r l o  i n  H u m a n  D e v e l o p m e n t  4 8  ( 2 0 0 5 )       7
Merging Blasi’s ideas regarding the structure of identity with his 
framework for morality yields a model of how identity might serve 
as a source of motivation for moral action. In addition to understand-
ing the objective importance of morality, for many people, moral con-
cerns are also important to their sense of who they are. However, 
among these individuals with moral identity contents (e.g., moral val-
ues and goals), there is variability in identity experience. Blasi [1993] 
describes this issue as follows: 
(…) several individuals may see morality as essential to their 
sense of self, of who they are. For some of them, however, 
moral ideals and demands happen to be there, a given of their 
nature over which they feel little control. In this case moral 
ideals exist next to other characteristics, all equally impor-
tant simply because they are there. Others instead relate to 
their moral ideals as being personally chosen over other ide-
als or demands, sense their fragility, and feel responsible to 
protect them and to thus protect their sense of self. (p. 103) 
Hence, links between moral identity contents and moral action might 
be moderated by subjective identity maturity. More specifically, the 
motivational force of moral identity contents should increase as they 
are actively appropriated into the core self. When moral concerns are 
self-appropriated, the heightened self-consistency motive and com-
mitment to actualize one’s core self (characteristic of mature subjec-
tive identity) can act as powerful sources of moral motivation. 
Strengths and Limitations of Blasi’s Model 
While a number of scholars have proposed a moral motivational role 
for the self, Blasi’s approach has several strengths that seem to set it 
apart. First, more than other models, Blasi’s positions a central role 
for the self. Blasi argues that focusing on moral understanding and 
moral emotions provides a limited picture of moral motivation; the 
self’s stance towards morality is also critically important. Further, as 
any adequate model of moral identity should, Blasi’s fuses theoretical 
notions of morality and identity. His model includes an articulate con-
ception of identity [Blasi, 2004a; Blasi & Glodis, 1995], complete with 
detailed bridges linking it to moral functioning [Blasi, 1993, 1995, in 
press]. This attention to detail and thorough coverage of both sides of 
moral identity sets Blasi’s model apart from others. 
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Second, in blending his notions of identity with a self-based model 
of morality, Blasi has provided the most elaborated description of how 
identity motivates moral action. Specifically, Blasi delineates how mat-
uration in experiential identity is associated with an increasing de-
sire for one’s life to remain consistent with one’s inner sense of self 
[Blasi, 2004a; Blasi & Glodis, 1995; Blasi & Oresick, 1987], and when 
this inner self is centered on moral concerns, it can provide power-
ful moral motivation [Blasi, 1993, 1995, in press]. Most other moral-
ity models that include a role for the self-provide minimal, if any, de-
tails regarding the structure of the self and mechanisms for linking it 
to moral functioning. 
Third, Blasi’s [2001, 2004a, in press] model paints a more agen-
tic picture of morality, where individual differences in moral desires, 
rather than differences in morally-relevant capacities (e.g., empathy, 
moral reasoning, or moral schemas), are the root of individual differ-
ences in moral behavior. Agentic views on the self are becoming in-
creasingly popular among contemporary theorists as they realize the 
important implications of such views [Little, Snyder, & Wehmeyer, in 
press]. According to Blasi [2001, 2004a], identity maturity is associ-
ated with an increasing sense of agency, which leads individuals to ap-
propriate certain aspects of themselves (e.g., values, goals, personal-
ity traits, and emotions) as central to their sense of self, while merely 
accepting or even rejecting others. This process produces feelings of 
ownership over those aspects chosen as core identity contents, along 
with a sense of obligation and commitment to protect and actualize 
them. Individuals are not simply receptacles that obtain moral under-
standing through cognitive development and socialization; rather, they 
selectively and deliberately infuse moral values with personal impor-
tance by integrating them into their sense of self. An agentic view of 
moral identity, such as Blasi’s, is critical because it gives individuals 
more control over and responsibility for their own morality, and with 
this, holds them more accountable for it. 
Lastly, by founding his moral identity model firmly on moral un-
derstanding, Blasi [2004b] ensures that the moral identity he de-
scribes is truly ‘moral.’ Essentially, when one has a moral identity: 
One continues to behave morally because moral norms and 
ideals are good and desirable; but, in addition, because acting 
against one’s core commitments would be a self-betrayal and 
damaging to one’s sense of self. The desire to maintain one’s 
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identity and to be consistent with it does not corrupt the na-
ture of morality because moral identity was constructed on 
the person’s caring about morality as it objectively is. [Blasi, 
2004b, p. 343]  
Thus, one need not be concerned, as some have suggested [Nucci, 
2004], that Blasi is proposing a form of ‘ethical egoism.’ Blasi is not 
merely posing the desire for self-consistency as a source of moral mo-
tivation; rather, moral action is motivated by a desire to remain consis-
tent with one’s identity as a moral person, concerned about morality. 
Blasi’s insightful and intriguing ideas regarding identity and mo-
rality have inspired interest in moral identity, and are beginning to 
spur empirical investigation into this facet of morality [Lapsley & Nar-
vaez, 2004a]. Still, there are several areas in which the model could 
be extended. First, it is unclear how Blasi’s moral identity model ap-
plies to moral behaviors that are to some degree automatic and less 
deliberate. Blasi [1999] insists, consistent with the principle of phe-
nomenalism, that behavior, to be considered ‘moral,’ must stem in-
tentionally from conscious moral reasons. Yet, if as Lapsley and Nar-
vaez (in press) argue, much of daily social cognitive functioning is 
tacit and automatic, then strict adherence to phenomenalism drasti-
cally reduces the moral domain to behaviors that are fairly uncom-
mon to everyday life. Blasi [2004b] has acknowledged that although 
morality must be grounded in moral understanding, the type of moral 
understanding required for behavior to be considered moral may be 
‘implicit and un-verbalized’ (p. 339). However, more discussion of the 
processes linking moral identity to the more implicit modes of moral 
functioning would be helpful. 
Second, in Blasi’s model, identity does not typically emerge as an 
important source of moral motivation until young adulthood. Moral 
motivation stemming from identity results when a mature identity is 
centered on moral concerns. However, the form of subjective iden-
tity necessary to provide a strong desire to maintain consistency with 
one’s sense of self as a moral person is not typically experienced un-
til at least adolescence, and even thereafter, is not present in the ma-
jority of individuals. For most people, particularly prior to adulthood, 
morality is not motivated by identity; rather, it will stem from other 
concerns, such as the desire to uphold moral principles. But, as Blasi 
[1984, 1995, 2004b] indicates, these other moral motives may be less 
compelling than moral identity and, therefore, less reliable in their 
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ability to yield moral behavior. Thus, Blasi’s model could be extended 
by a discussion of the ways moral concerns may be integrated into 
personality, in addition to appropriation into identity, that will en-
rich our understanding of moral motivation and commitment at ear-
lier ages [Blasi, 1993, 2001]. 
Third, Blasi’s moral identity model does not include adequate dis-
cussion of developmental processes and antecedents. In line with Da-
mon’s [1984] observation, Blasi [1995] assumes that identity and 
morality are two psychological systems that initially develop inde-
pendently and later become integrated or united in some individu-
als during or following adolescence; yet this integrative process has 
not been sufficiently detailed. In terms of identity, Blasi [1988, 2001, 
2004a; Blasi & Glodis, 1995] outlined a series of developmentally or-
dered modes of experiential identity, but has only minimally discussed 
the processes of individual developmental progression, and has not 
addressed factors that may facilitate or hinder these processes. More-
over, Blasi has given little discussion to why and how some individu-
als center their identity on moral concerns, but others do not. Greater 
attention to these issues might make Blasi’s model more complete and 
more practically useful. 
Lastly, Blasi’s model might be enriched by further detailing the 
role of emotion. The importance of emotion in identity [Bosma & Kun-
nen, 2001] and morality [Carlo, in press; Hoffman, 2000] has been 
noted by others. Although Blasi [in press] does emphasize the place of 
affective components such as motivation and desire, it is sometimes 
unclear what role emotions play. For example, it would be helpful to 
know how moral emotions, such as empathy, might be involved in 
moral identity formation and in linking identity to action. 
Blasi’s model is by no means the final word on moral identity; 
rather, we propose it as a good starting point for further investiga-
tion into moral motivation, and more specifically links between iden-
tity and morality. To this end, we feel it is deserving of more attention 
by those interested in moral functioning. As yet, Blasi’s notions have 
been the subject of little empirical research. Further, there has been a 
lack of critical dialogue pertaining to Blasi’s ideas [for exceptions, see 
Monroe, 2001; Nucci, 2004; Turiel, 2002]. Thus, we advocate more 
conceptual and empirical examination of Blasi’s model. 
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Moral Identity and Moral Action: An Empirical Review 
The notion of moral identity has thus far primarily attracted theoret-
ical and philosophical attention rather than empirical research. It is 
unclear why this is the case. Possibly the abstract and complex nature 
of identity and morality has made moral identity overly difficult to op-
erationalize and systematically examine. Additionally, Kohlberg’s cog-
nitive developmental paradigm continues to overwhelm other emer-
gent approaches to morality. Regardless, the fact is that we have very 
little empirical research that has directly investigated and validated 
the moral identity construct. Much of the evidence that we do have 
is reviewed below, and provides some validation for the position that 
identity may play an important role in moral motivation. 
Studies of Moral Exemplars 
Some scholars study moral commitment through detailed examina-
tion of morally exemplary individuals, at times comparing them to 
non-exemplars [e.g., Colby & Damon, 1992; Hart & Fegley, 1995; Mat-
suba & Walker, 2004; Monroe, 2004; Oliner & Oliner, 1988; Reimer, 
2003; Reimer & Wade-Stein, 2004]. Often insight can be gleaned 
from these studies regarding the role of moral identity in moral mo-
tivation. For example, Colby and Damon [1992] concluded from their 
in-depth exploration of adult moral exemplars (nominated by philos-
ophers, scholars, theologians, and religious leaders) that individu-
als whose lives are devoted to moral causes tend to experience unity 
between their self and moral goals such that, ‘their own interests 
[are] synonymous with their moral goals’ (p. 299). These individu-
als exemplify Blasi’s [in press] moral identity in that they seemed to 
have constructed their identities around morality to the point that 
there was no struggle to reconcile their moral principles and com-
mitments with their personal goal and desires or other aspects of 
their identities. For, as Blasi [2001] states, ‘the apex of moral mo-
tivation (…) is to desire the morally good in the same way one de-
sires what satisfies one’s most intimate and deepest needs’ (p. 319). 
Colby and Damon [1992] note that this fusion of morality and self 
is likely evident to some degree in most adults, but in moral exem-
plars it is more of a complete unity. 
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Other studies have compared adolescent moral exemplars (nom-
inated by community leaders) to non-exemplar teens. For example, 
Hart and Fegley [1995] administered a semi-structured interview mea-
sure of self-concept to 15 exemplars and 15 comparison teens. They 
discovered that adolescent moral exemplars more frequently used 
moral personality traits (e.g., honest) and moral goals (e.g., help oth-
ers) to describe themselves than comparison teens. Reimer and Wade-
Stein [2004] reported similar findings from their study which used 
a sophisticated computational model (Latent Semantic Analysis) to 
compare self-descriptors with self-representations in semantic space. 
Self-related perceptions were gathered from 15 adolescent moral ex-
emplars and 15 comparison teens using a semi-structured interview 
similar to that used by Hart and Fegley [1995]. Of the self-descrip-
tors most closely associated with the actual self-representations of the 
participants (the type of person they currently are), a greater portion 
was positive, moral, or caring among the exemplars than the compar-
ison teens. Results of these studies seem in line with Blasi’s [1995] 
conception of moral identity in that the salient self-representations 
of teens who exhibited high levels of moral commitment and action 
were more morally based than those of comparison teens. However, 
self-representations seem to only capture a small piece of the essence 
of Blasi’s moral identity. In other words, self-representations reflect 
how one sees oneself, not necessarily what one sees as most central or 
important to one’s sense of self. Further, self-representations largely 
tap identity contents; hence, the subjective side of Blasi’s moral iden-
tity is not adequately accounted for in these studies. 
In short, while many people might understand the objective im-
portance of moral concerns, individuals who exhibit high levels of 
commitment to moral causes are more likely than others to construct 
their self-concept and identity around these moral concerns. Not only 
do moral exemplars define themselves in moral terms, but their per-
sonal desires are in line with their moral principles. Because of this, 
they are compelled to live according to moral principles such that they 
feel they can do no other, and the thought of betraying these princi-
ples is aversive. Thus, studies of moral exemplars provide some sup-
port for Blasi’s [2004b, in press] notion that the self-importance and 
identity centrality of moral concerns might serve as a motive capable 
of sustaining stable and substantial moral commitment. 
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Studies of Moral Identity and Moral Behavior 
Rather than using moral commitment and behavior as a criterion for 
sample selection, as in exemplar studies, other researchers have mea-
sured moral identity as an a-priori predictor of moral behavior. For 
example, Arnold [1993] examined links between the self-importance 
of morality and moral behavior among adolescents. Moral self was as-
sessed using the Good-Self Assessment, which involved a pictorial-self 
task adapted from Harter and Monsour [1992]. As part of this task 
participants were first presented with a diagram of three concentric 
circles, each corresponding to a different degree of centrality to the 
self. Then, they were given a zip-lock bag containing 16 labels, each 
with a different virtue written on it; some of the virtues were moral 
(e.g., fair to others), while others were not (e.g., creative). Participants 
were then asked to place each label in the appropriate circle in order 
to indicate those virtues that are most central, less central, and least 
central to who they are (only three labels could be placed in the in-
nermost circle). In addition, participants were interviewed and asked 
for reasons why they selected the three most central virtues as the 
most important to them. Based on the placement of the virtue labels, 
a 6-point moral identification scale was created to reflect the degree 
to which adolescents identified more with moral, as opposed to non-
moral virtues. Also, a scale for moral motivation was created based 
on the extent to which participants gave ‘moral’ reasons for choosing 
their central virtues. Moral behavior was assessed using the Ethical 
Behavior Rating Scale [Hill & Swanson, 1985], a teacher-report mea-
sure of various morally-relevant behavioral tendencies (sample item: 
‘Speaks out for fairness for others as well as self’). Analyses revealed 
that both moral identification and moral motivation positively pre-
dicted moral behavior. Thus, teens who selected moral virtues as cen-
tral to their sense of self and gave moral reasons for caring about these 
virtues were reported as exhibiting higher levels of moral behavior. 
A more recent study examined behavioral correlates of moral self 
longitudinally among late adolescents [Pratt, Hunsberger, Pancer, & 
Alisat, 2003]. Participants were presented 12 values and asked to rate 
the extent to which each ‘should be important for them in their lives’ 
(6 moral and 6 non-moral values). To create a moral self-scale, the 
total for the non-moral values was subtracted from the total for the 
moral values. The outcome measure was a community involvement 
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scale that assessed frequency of involvement in community (e.g., vol-
unteering with service organization), political (e.g., collecting sig-
natures for a petition), responding (e.g., giving money), and helping 
(e.g., visiting the sick) activities. Moral self at Time 1 was positively 
associated with overall community involvement at Time 1 as well as 
with the four subscales of community involvement. Further, Time 2 
moral self was positively correlated with overall community involve-
ment at Time 2 and with three of the four subscales (moral self was 
not significantly associated with political activities). Longitudinally, 
Time 1 moral self did not significantly predict Time 2 community in-
volvement (controlling for Time 1 community involvement). However, 
Time 1 community involvement was positively associated with Time 2 
moral self (controlling for Time 1 moral self). The strongest link was 
between helping activities and later moral self. These findings are in 
line with Youniss and Yates’ [1997] work in suggesting that, although 
there might be a positive link between moral self and prosocial behav-
ior, involvement in prosocial activities may precede the importance of 
moral values to the self. 
Aquino and Reed [2002] have explored links between moral iden-
tity and various moral behaviors in adults. They conceptualize moral 
identity as a form of social identity as well as ‘a self-conception orga-
nized around a set of moral traits’ (p. 1424). Thus they assume that 
although the content of individual moral identities may differ some-
what (e.g., an emphasis on caring versus justice), there ‘exists a set of 
common moral traits likely to be central to most people’s moral self-
definitions’ [Aquino & Reed, 2002, p. 1424]. Hence, they argue that, 
‘to measure moral identity, it should not be necessary, in principle, to 
discover the entire universe of traits that might compose a person’s 
unique moral identity. Rather, all that is needed to invoke and subse-
quently measure the self-importance of a person’s moral identity is to 
activate a subset of moral traits that are linked to other moral traits 
that may be more central to a particular person’s self-concept’ [Aquino 
& Reed, 2002, pp 1424f.]. 
Through a series of several different studies, Aquino and Reed 
[2002] created a 10-item questionnaire for assessing moral identity 
in adults. This self-report paper-and-pencil measure involves (1) pre-
senting participants with a list of nine moral traits, (2) asking them 
to visualize a person with those traits (their self or someone else) and 
how that person would think, feel, and act, and (3) having them rate 
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statements such as, ‘It would make me feel good to be a person who 
has these characteristics.’ Based on the properties of identity outlined 
by Erikson [1964], Aquino and Reed [2002] identified two 5-item sub-
scales: one to indicate ‘the respondent’s actions in the world’ (labeled 
symbolization) and another to tap ‘the degree to which the moral 
traits are central to the self-concept’ (labeled internalization). 
Aquino, Reed, and colleagues have conducted several studies to as-
sess the validity of their measure and its ability to predict moral be-
havior. For example, among college alumni, they reported that both 
internalization and symbolization positively predicted self-report vol-
unteerism (controlling for age, gender, and social desirability) [Aquino 
& Reed, 2002]. However, among adolescents, internalization but not 
symbolization was significantly positively related to actual donation 
behavior. In follow-up studies, moral identity, particularly the inter-
nalization dimension, has been positively related to various morally 
relevant social (e.g., inter-group relations, such as regard for out-
group members) [Reed & Aquino, 2003] and negatively associated 
with lying in business negotiations [Aquino, Ray, & Reed, 2003]. 
A final study with implications for moral identity examined links 
between moral self and antisocial behavior in late adolescents [Bar-
riga, Morrison, Liau, & Gibbs, 2001]. Using an adapted version of Ar-
nold’s [1993] Good-Self Assessment, Barriga et al. [2001] assessed 
moral self-relevance, defined as ‘the centrality to the self-concept of 
moral virtues’ (p. 542). This measure included 8 moral and 8 non-
moral virtues. The moral self-relevance scale was created by subtract-
ing the average ratings on the non-moral virtues from the average on 
the moral virtues. Antisocial behavior was measured using the Ex-
ternalizing Behaviors Subscale from Achenbach’s parent-report Child 
Behavior Checklist and self-report Youth Self-Report Form. Moral 
self-relevance was negatively associated with antisocial behavior (ex-
ternalizing), controlling for gender, internalizing behaviors, self-serv-
ing cognitive distortion, and moral judgment. 
In summary, although the research on moral identity and behav-
ioral outcomes is sparse, results thus far generally validate Blasi’s 
conception of moral identity as a source of moral motivation. Specifi-
cally, teens and adults who reported moral values and virtues as being 
more important to their self-concept or more central to their identity 
also more frequently engaged in moral behavior. However, although 
the moral identity measures in these studies provide a window into 
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individuals’ identity contents, they do not adequately account for the 
more experiential aspects of identity emphasized by Blasi, such as 
unity and organization, or conative facets such as agency and the de-
sire for self-consistency [Blasi, 2004b, in press]. Thus, although these 
studies suggest moral identity may be able to motivate moral behav-
ior, they provide limited information regarding how and why. 
Conclusions drawn from results of studies on moral identity and 
behavior should be tentative for two reasons. First, regarding effect 
sizes for relations between moral self and behavior, only effects re-
ported by Arnold [1993] were relatively large (η values of 0.47–0.60); 
effects for all other studies were small to moderate (η values of 0.07–
0.27). It is unclear whether there is a conceptual reason for this vari-
ability in effect sizes or whether it is due to differences in method-
ology or sample characteristics. Second, work by Pratt et al. [2003] 
and others [Youniss & Yates, 1997] reminds us that the direction of 
causality between moral identity and moral behavior is still unclear. 
While moral identity might motivate moral action, these studies sug-
gest that, at least in adolescence, involvement in moral action may 
precede moral identity development. Bidirectional relations between 
moral identity and behavior also seem plausible, in that involvement 
in moral action may promote moral identity development, which then 
motivates subsequent moral behavior and commitment. This possi-
bility is not incongruous with Blasi’s [2001] ideas on moral identity, 
for Blasi argues that mature moral identity is rare prior to late ado-
lescence and young adulthood. However, thus far, there is no firm ev-
idence that moral identity precedes or causes moral behavior, and in-
sufficient evidence to support the inverse relation. In short, empirical 
investigation of moral identity is just beginning, leaving much work 
to be done before any conclusions can be drawn. 
Other Relevant Research 
Other areas of research not specifically directed at understanding 
moral identity also provide support for the notion of moral identity as 
a motivation for moral behavior. For example, attributional research 
has found that children given prosocial character attributions by care-
givers are more likely to behave pro-socially and thus act consistent 
with their attributed self-concept as prosocial individuals [Grusec & 
Redler, 1980]. Additionally, according to Deci and Ryan [1991], when 
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individuals internalize certain values, they ‘fully assimilate them (…) 
accept them as their own, and bring them into consistent relation to 
the other needs, processes, and values that represent self’ (p. 255). 
In line with this, it was found that children’s prosocial internalization 
was positively associated with empathy and relatedness with others 
[Ryan & Connell, 1989]. Lastly, Verplanken and Holland [2002] con-
ducted a series of experiments on value centrality, defined as when 
certain values ‘make up part of one’s self-definition and, thus, contrib-
ute to one’s sense of identity’ (p. 435). Their findings indicated that 
value-congruent behavior only results when values are both central 
to the self and are activated (i.e., brought to one’s attention or made 
more accessible); however, they suggested that such activation occurs 
frequently in everyday situations. For example, they found that altru-
istic values were related to donating behavior only if they were central 
to the self, and only for participants in an enhanced self-focus condi-
tion of the experiment. From this series of studies they concluded that 
‘the self might function as a crucial structure that mediates between 
values and behavior’ [Verplanken & Holland, 2002, p. 444]. In short, 
congruent with Blasi’s [1995; in press] model of moral identity, these 
areas of research demonstrate the importance of the self, and the val-
ues and attributes it is comprised of, in motivating moral action. 
Future Directions for Research on Moral Identity 
Unanswered Questions 
The concept of moral identity emerged in the social sciences literature 
over two decades ago, largely spurred by Blasi’s [1980, 1983, 1984] 
work in the early 1980s. However, although Blasi set the stage for con-
ceptual discussion of moral identity, empirical research on moral iden-
tity has been slow in coming; thus, the field must continue to move 
beyond mere philosophizing and theorizing about moral identity to 
a more thoughtful and innovative empirical examination of the con-
struct. As scholars embark on this effort, there are several specific 
questions that seem most urgent. A few of these are discussed below. 
First, what is the causal nature of relations between moral iden-
tity and moral behavior? Most work on moral identity presents it 
as a source of motivation for, and thus a precursor of, moral action. 
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However, longitudinal studies have yielded information that suggests 
relations between moral identity and moral action may be complex. 
Specifically, Pratt et al. [2003] found that, whereas moral self did not 
predict later community involvement among adolescents, the inverse 
effect was significant, in that community involvement predicted subse-
quent moral self. These results echo the qualitative findings reported 
by Youniss and Yates [1997] in their study of the youth service learn-
ing program. Both studies reported results that suggest positive asso-
ciations between moral identity and moral action, at least in adoles-
cence, may be due to the influence of moral action on one’s identity 
rather than the other way around. However, these studies were re-
stricted to adolescence; thus, the conclusion that the effect from moral 
action to moral identity may be stronger than the inverse (identity to 
action), may primarily be true for this age period, during which iden-
tity formation is occurring. It is possible that relations between moral 
identity and moral behavior are bidirectional in that involvement in 
moral action influences moral identity formation, and moral identity 
subsequently acts as a source of moral motivation and commitment 
[Davidson & Youniss, 1991; Youniss & Yates, 1997]. More longitudi-
nal work is needed to further untangle the nature of causal relations 
between moral identity and moral action. Moreover, moral identity 
research thus far has been nonexperimental; hence, causal interpre-
tation of results should be tentative and future experimental or quasi-
experimental research is welcome.  
Second, what mechanisms link moral identity to moral action? A 
few scholars have outlined ideas that provide a good starting point 
for understanding this issue. For example, as discussed earlier, Bla-
si’s [1983, 1984, 1993, 1995, 2004b] work provides one perspective 
on how moral identity might act as a source of moral motivation. His 
Self-Model of moral functioning positions identity as a possible me-
diating factor between moral understanding and moral action [Blasi, 
1983]. Additionally, his ideas about the structure of identity help us 
understand how it might be able to provide the motivational spark for 
moral action, with a focus on the role of the need for self-consistency 
that increases as a function of subjective identity maturity [Blasi, 
1993, 2004a; Blasi & Glodis, 1995; Blasi & Milton, 1991; Blasi & Ore-
sick, 1987; Glodis & Blasi, 1993]. Essentially, one has a moral identity 
to the extent that he or she has actively constructed an identity cen-
tered on moral concerns, providing a strong sense of obligation and 
commitment to living consistent with these concerns.  
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Additionally, Lapsley and Narvaez [2004b; Narvaez & Lapsley, in 
press] have posited a social-cognitive mechanism for linking moral 
identity to moral behavior. A focal point of their perspective is the no-
tion that individuals have schemas (i.e., cognitive-affective structures) 
that guide how they perceive of, interpret, and respond to their social 
environment. For schemas to be utilized in social contexts, they must 
be accessible or readily activated. Regarding morality, ‘a person who 
has a moral identity (…) would be one for whom moral constructs are 
chronically accessible and easily activated for social information-pro-
cessing’ [Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004b, pp. 200f]. As a practical example, 
consider a woman whose identity is centered on kindness, and whose 
conception of kindness includes holding doors open for other peo-
ple when entering a building. According to Lapsley and Narvaez, this 
woman would likely have readily available kindness schemas in place 
such that she would not need to consciously deliberate about each op-
portunity to hold a door for another, but could function largely auto-
matically in many situations.  
One moral schema that may be of particular importance to moral 
functioning is the individual’s understanding of what it means to be 
a moral person [Lapsley & Laskey, 2001; Walker & Hennig, 2004; 
Walker & Pitts, 1998]. These conceptions of moral personality may 
form cognitive prototypes capable of impacting social information 
processing in moral situations [Lapsley & Laskey, 2001; Walker & 
Hennig, 2004]. Moreover, the cognitive accessibility of these moral 
prototypes for information processing may be proportional to their 
importance to the individual’s identity [Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004b]. 
When one’s moral prototype is central to one’s sense of self, there 
may be increased motivation to live consistent with this conception 
of what it means to be moral. Overlap between one’s moral prototype 
and ideal or desired self may similarly compel moral action, as well as 
drive moral growth, as seen in the lives of many of the moral exem-
plars studied by Colby and Damon [1992]. In short, the moral schema 
literature, along with the moral identity literature, offer some insight 
into links between identity and morality [for an additional perspec-
tive, see Monroe, 2001]. Yet, little empirical validation of these ideas 
has occurred. Elucidation of the mechanisms linking identity to mo-
rality is central to work on moral identity; therefore, conceptual and 
empirical investigation into this issue is strongly urged. 
Third, what factors might mediate or moderate links between 
moral identity and moral action? Even when moral principles are 
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central to the self, they do not always lead directly and consistently 
to the moral behavior which they dictate. Scholars have noted that 
it is possible for individuals to act contrary to their sense of identity 
[e.g., Blasi, 1983]. Thus, there must be certain factors that lie between 
moral identity and moral behavior. 
First, individuals must decide to act on their moral identity. Even 
though, for example, a man may have judged that helping another is 
the most moral thing to do in a certain situation, and decided that he 
is personally responsible (based on his identity) for helping in that 
situation, he will still need to decide to help. Therefore, the final de-
cision is the decision of behavioral intention. Gollwitzer [1993] sub-
mits behavior intentions are proximal causes of behavior, and notes 
that, ‘Whereas the attitude represents an evaluation of the action, the 
respective intention is seen as the result of a decision to execute this 
action’ (p. 145). So, although moral judgment and moral identity may 
be seen as attitudes that influence behavior, ultimately a decision of 
behavioral intention must be made, and in any given situation there 
are multiple influences on this decision [Eisenberg, 1986; Nisan, 2004; 
Nucci, 2004; Turiel, 2002]. Rest [1983] describes this as the choice to 
prioritize the moral ideal over other concerns. For example, a teenage 
girl sees an unpopular boy getting bullied, and knows that the right 
thing to do would be to help the boy. She also feels a sense of obliga-
tion to help. However, there is the fear that she will get injured in try-
ing to help the boy. Also, other peers are present, and not only is she 
shy, but, since the victim is unpopular, helping him could tarnish her 
image. Finally, she is late for her next class, and there is an important 
test that day. As Social Domain Theorists remind us, and this example 
illustrates, moral situations are complex [Nucci, 2004; Turiel, 2002]. 
Hence, moral identity must operate in the midst of many factors, both 
individual and contextual. Individuals will not always choose to act 
consistent with their moral identity; as a result, they will most likely 
experience negative affective consequences [e.g., guilt; Blasi, 1983]. 
If one decides to act on one’s moral understanding and moral iden-
tity, there are still factors that may preclude the moral action from ac-
tually happening. More specifically, an individual may have a moral 
identity and strong moral intentions, but lack the necessary skills 
to follow through with those intentions [e.g., self-regulation; Blasi, 
1983, 1995; Kohlberg & Candee, 1984]. Thus, although moral iden-
tity might be an important and often neglected piece of the puzzle of 
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moral functioning, it is by no means the only piece [Nucci, 2004]. It 
is but one factor in a multitude of factors that influence the likelihood 
of individuals engaging in moral behavior. As such, research should 
expand beyond examining bivariate links between moral identity and 
moral action, and consider relations between these two constructs in 
the contexts in which they occur. Also, it would be interesting to ex-
plore the role of moral identity in decisions of intention to act mor-
ally [Nucci, 2004]. 
Fourth, how does moral identity relate to everyday, more auto-
matic, less reflective moral behavior? Most models of morality are pri-
marily designed to account for moral action that is more deliberate – 
the result of moral reflection and judgment; but, the majority of moral 
action is likely more spontaneous or habitual [Davidson & Youniss, 
1991; Haidt, 2001; Lapsley & Narvaez, in press; Walker, 2004]. Moral 
growth may largely be a matter of becoming more adept and fluid at 
moral functioning, and a key factor in this process might be the pro-
gressive integration of individuals’ moral and self-systems [Colby & 
Damon, 1992; Davidson & Youniss, 1991; Narvaez & Lapsley, in press; 
Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004b]. This is evidenced by studies revealing the 
extensive spontaneous moral actions and unhesitating moral commit-
ments of moral exemplars [Colby & Damon, 1992; Monroe, 2004]. One 
possible mechanism for this is that moral identity might entail hav-
ing cognitively accessible moral schemas capable of carrying out some 
aspects of moral functioning largely outside of consciousness [Laps-
ley & Laskey, 2001; Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004b; Narvaez & Lapsley, in 
press; Walker & Hennig, 2004]. Additionally, when an individual has 
a moral identity such that he or she strongly desires to be a moral per-
son, it provides fertile ground to nurture moral instincts and foster 
moral habits [Colby & Damon, 1992; Davidson & Youniss, 1991]. The 
field will benefit greatly from efforts to better understand how moral 
identity leads to greater facility and spontaneity of morality. 
Fifth, how is moral identity related to prohibitive morality? Moral 
identity research has primarily focused on understanding links be-
tween moral identity and prosocial behavior and commitment [e.g., 
Aquino & Reed, 2002; Arnold, 1993; Colby & Damon, 1992; Hart & 
Fegley, 1995; Reimer & Wade-Stein, 2004; Pratt et al., 2003; Reed & 
Aquino, 2003], with few exceptions [e.g., Aquino, Ray, & Reed, 2003; 
Barriga et al., 2001]. Furthermore, conceptual discussions of moral 
identity generally seem more targeted at understanding moral identity 
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as a source of motivation for action rather than inaction [e.g., Blasi, 
1995]. However, morality involves both prescriptions and prohibitions 
(i.e., principles dictating action and inaction) [Turiel, 2002] within 
multiple dimensions, e.g., care and justice [Nunner-Winkler, 1984]. 
Hence, moral identity may motivate individuals to behave pro-socially 
towards others as well as to avoid behaving antisocially towards them. 
Yet at present, we know little about how moral identity relates to pro-
hibitive morality, and whether it is differentially linked to prescriptive 
and prohibitive morality. By expanding this research to a broader ar-
ray of morally relevant behaviors and contexts, we will gain a fuller 
picture of the role of moral identity in moral functioning. 
Sixth, how does moral identity relate to other aspects of moral 
personality, such as moral understanding and moral emotion? In re-
sponse to the dominance of the narrowly-focused cognitive devel-
opmental approach to morality, an increasing number of scholars in 
recent years have pushed for more integrative views of moral func-
tioning [Blasi, 1995; Carlo, in press; Eisenberg, 1986; Gibbs, 2003; 
Lapsley & Narvaez, 2004a; Walker & Hennig, 1997]. In large part this 
is a movement towards a more holistic interest in moral personality 
and in interconnections between the different facets of moral person-
ality, such as moral understanding, moral emotion, moral identity, and 
moral behavior. It is likely that moving forward in this regard will re-
quire new ways of thinking, and as Lapsley and Narvaez [in press] 
have declared, ‘productive lines of moral psychological research in the 
“post-Kohlbergian era” will be found by searching for integrative pos-
sibilities with other domains of psychological research.’ As an example 
of this, Lapsley and Narvaez [2004b] drew from the social cognition 
and information-processing literatures to develop their integrative 
model of moral personality that emphasizes the role of cognitive-af-
fective moral schemas in all components of moral functioning (per-
ception, judgment, motivation, and action).  
Of particular interest are the interrelations between moral iden-
tity, moral understanding, and moral emotion, and their relative roles 
in motivating moral action. Gibbs [2003] recently discussed these 
three facets of morality as the three primacies of moral motivation. 
However, despite occasional acknowledgement by scholars that rea-
soning, emotion, and identity are all important to moral function-
ing, little has been done to empirically explicate links between these 
three facets and to understand their relative role in relation to moral 
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behavior. Part of the difficulty is that cognition, emotion, and iden-
tity are overlapping constructs and dimensions of human function-
ing [Damasio, 1994; Eisenberg et al., 1991; Reimer, 2003]. Therefore, 
successful examination of these issues will likely require diverse, cre-
ative, and innovative methodological approaches. 
One approach to understanding personality correlates of moral 
identity is through in-depth exploration of moral exemplars, and com-
paring exemplars to non-exemplary individuals. As an example, Mat-
suba and Walker [2004] compared 40 young adult moral exemplars to 
40 comparison individuals on personality traits, adult attachment, ego 
identity, moral reasoning, and faith development; they found partial 
support for relations between these facets of personality and moral ex-
emplarity. To the degree that moral exemplars have identities centered 
on morality, these results indicate potential personality correlates of 
moral identity. However, moral identity was not directly assessed; thus, 
implications of this research for moral identity are tentative. Still, ex-
emplar research is the sort of methodological approach with promise 
for elucidating the place of moral identity in moral personality. 
Seventh, how does moral identity develop? We know little about 
the processes by which moral identity develops. Several scholars have 
proposed that moral identity development occurs as the moral and 
self-systems, separate in childhood, become integrated or unified in 
adolescence [Bergman, 2002; Blasi, 1995, 2001; Colby & Damon, 1992; 
Damon, 1984, 2000; Nucci, 2001]. There is some empirical support for 
this claim. For example, research on self-understanding development 
from childhood through adolescence has revealed that moral princi-
ples are seldom used as self-descriptors until adolescence [Damon & 
Hart, 1988]. When children do use moral self-descriptors, they tend to 
be positive (e.g., ‘good’ or ‘nice’) and refer to the child’s external be-
havior [Damon & Hart, 1988; Power & Khmelkov, 1998]. Use of moral 
terms in a self-evaluative or self-critical manner is infrequent prior 
to adolescence [Power & Khmelkov, 1998]; and, according to Nucci 
[2001], this capacity is necessary for the self to serve as a source of 
moral motivation. Additionally, while young children may have a ba-
sic understanding of moral rules, they often lack the motivation and 
sense of self-responsibility to act on them [Blasi, 1995, 2001; Keller & 
Edelstein, 1993; Nunner-Winkler, 1998].  
Little is known about the processes by which the separate devel-
oping systems of self and morality become united in some individuals, 
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but some scholars have proffered ideas about how this might proceed 
[Blasi, 1993, 1995, 2001, in press; Damon, 1984, 2000; Keller & Edel-
stein, 1993; see also Deci & Ryan, 1991]. As children start to reflect 
on how their characteristics and behaviors affect others, they begin 
to view themselves in moral terms (e.g., kind, honest, or fair). Fur-
ther, through interactions with peers, parents, and others, children 
to varying degrees develop appreciation and concern for morality; 
hence, moral ideals become not only understood as objectively impor-
tant, but important to them personally. These processes seem to sig-
nal the start of the integration of morality and self. The pinnacle of 
this integration is when, in adolescence or adulthood, some individu-
als construct a unified identity around a core of deeply rooted moral 
concerns. In short, as Blasi [1993] suggests, moral understanding and 
concern for morality likely develop early, and what changes after that 
is the relation between this developing morality and one’s identity. 
Work is needed to further elucidate the developmental processes of 
moral identity formation, including examination of the emergence of 
concern for morality, subjective identity maturation, and the self-ap-
propriation of moral concerns. 
Eighth, what factors influence moral identity development? Iden-
tifying factors that foster moral identity development is imperative; 
this sort of knowledge may be invaluable to moral education and youth 
development efforts. Yet, little conceptual or empirical work has been 
done to reveal such factors. Most work directly relevant to this issue 
has been led by Daniel Hart [for a review of much of this work, see 
Hart, in press]. Hart and colleagues have proposed, refined, and be-
gun to empirically examine, a model of predictors of moral identity 
development. This model posits five factors that influence moral iden-
tity formation. Two factors (the first layer of the model), personality 
and social structure (e.g., socioeconomic status), are stable, resistant 
to change, largely beyond the individual’s control, and are the founda-
tion for many aspects of child and adolescent development. The other 
three factors (the second layer of the model) more directly influence 
and constitute moral identity, and are more malleable and under the 
individual’s control: moral cognitions (e.g., moral judgments and at-
titudes), self and identity, and opportunities for moral action. Per-
sonality and social structure influence moral identity development 
directly as well as indirectly by way of these second-layer factors. Us-
ing national datasets, with voluntary community service as a marker 
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for moral identity, Hart and colleagues have found support for their 
model [Atkins, Hart, & Donnelly, 2004; Hart, in press; Hart & Atkins, 
2004; Hart, Atkins, & Ford, 1998, 1999].  
Others have echoed Hart’s [in press] supposition that engage-
ment in moral action can lead to integration of morality into one’s 
identity [Damon, 2000; Youniss & Yates, 1997]. In particular, Youniss 
and Yates [1997] found evidence for this notion in their ethnographic 
study of a youth service learning program. As part of a high school 
social justice course, 160 students were required to work at an in-
ner-city soup kitchen. In-class discussion and course assignments 
probed students to reflect on moral ideals and their practical appli-
cation. Then, service at the soup kitchen provided opportunities for 
them to experience themselves acting on those moral ideals. Youniss 
and Yates did not specifically assess moral identity at any point dur-
ing their study. However, they reported that, over time, the youth in-
volved in this program became aware of and reflected on moral and 
social issues transcendent to themselves, such as homelessness, and 
began to see themselves as agents capable of and responsible for mak-
ing a difference and improving the well-being of others. During this 
process of reflection and action, it seemed that many of these youth 
were integrating moral ideologies and moral commitments into their 
developing identities.  
Additionally, some have suggested interaction in positive peer rela-
tionships facilitates moral identity development [Davidson & Youniss, 
1991; Keller & Edelstein, 1993]. According to Davidson and Youniss 
[1991], peer relationships, more characterized by equality and cooper-
ation than relationships with adults, provide children and youth with 
the experience of interacting according to the reciprocity norm. This 
helps them progress from heteronomous egocentrism to autonomous 
moral judgment and autonomous self-conscious personality. Thus, de-
velopment in morality and identity is interconnected, and both arise 
largely from early peer relationships. Similarly, Keller and Edelstein 
[1993] posit that in peer relationships, children become aware of the 
consequences their actions have for others. They come to realize that 
the morality of their actions and their self is continually evaluated by 
others. This leads to the development of a system for self-evaluation 
of one’s actions and self-based on one’s moral ideals. Individuals are 
then motivated, based on felt and anticipated positive and negative 
self-evaluative affect, to act consistent with their moral ideals and the 
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moral image of themselves they want to reach or maintain. In short, 
peer interaction fosters socio-moral understanding and the develop-
ment of a sense of moral self-responsibility. 
Lastly, some suggest that certain aspects of the family context, 
such as parenting styles and practices, might have an impact on iden-
tity formation [Grotevant, 1998] as well as the internalization of val-
ues [Grolnick, Deci, & Ryan, 1997]. In particular, democratic parenting 
which provides a caring and supportive environment that encourages 
autonomy may facilitate adolescents’ identity development and the in-
tegration of values into their emerging identities. Additionally, studies 
of moral exemplars point to the importance of family context in the 
development of moral identity [Colby & Damon, 1992; Oliner & Oliner, 
1988]. Future studies should more systematically identify characteris-
tics of family contexts most conducive to moral identity development. 
Methodological Considerations 
As researchers embark on empirical examination of links between 
identity and morality, and explore important questions such as those 
detailed above, they are urged to consider a few recommendations. 
First, much more attention needs to be paid to the operationalization 
and measurement of moral identity. Thus far, there have been several 
approaches to moral identity assessment, each with its own strengths 
and limitations. Some researchers tally the relative frequency with 
which morally relevant terms are used in self-descriptions [e.g., Hart 
& Fegley, 1995; Reimer & Wade-Steiner, 2004], have participants rate 
the degree to which certain moral values are central to their sense of 
self [e.g., Arnold, 1993; Pratt et al., 2003], or use other similar ap-
proaches [e.g., Aquino & Reed, 2002]. These measures seem to essen-
tially be assessing the relevance of morality to the self-as-object (or 
self-concept), which corresponds to the facet of Blasi’s identity that 
we have referred to as identity content. While this is a significant 
part of moral identity to Blasi [2004; Blasi & Glodis, 1995] and others 
[e.g., Moshman, 2005], identity is more advanced and complex than 
self-concept; thus, much of what might be involved in moral identity 
(e.g., subjective identity maturity) is being overlooked in these stud-
ies. Therefore, to suggest that these are all studies of moral identity ei-
ther indicates differing conceptions of moral identity or a partial dis-
connection between the researchers’ conceptualizations and measures 
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of moral identity. An additional limitation of measures such as these 
is that they assume individuals have ready access to their moral iden-
tities; however, access to one’s cognitive schemata is complex [Ajzen 
& Fishbein, 1980], and individuals sometimes distort their self-mean-
ings [Moshman, 2004]. 
Some scholars have used other methods to indirectly assess moral 
identity, possibly due to the challenges and limitations of using ob-
jective measures. For example, Hart and colleagues [Hart, in press] 
have in several studies used voluntary community service as a marker 
of moral identity. In other research, moral exemplars are nominated 
by community leaders, and their moral exemplar status is used as an 
indication of moral identity [e.g., Matsuba & Walker, 2004; Reimer, 
2003]. These methods for assessing moral identity seem capable of 
getting at more of the richness and complexity encompassed in moral 
identity, but they require the assumption that individuals who engage 
in high levels of prosocial behavior have moral identities. However, 
it is uncertain to what extent such individuals have moral identities, 
because their prosocial actions could have stemmed from a variety of 
motivational sources (e.g., empathy, moral understanding, or selfish 
concerns) without moral principles being central to their identities.
In essence, the different methods used thus far for measuring 
moral identity all have their own strengths and limitations. While they 
have yielded useful information regarding relations between self and 
morality, none seem to assess moral identity in a way that is both di-
rect and fully captures the moral identity construct. Therefore, it is 
critical that effort is made to improve the way in which moral iden-
tity is operationalized and measured. In particular, we urge research-
ers to more clearly outline their conceptualizations of moral identity 
and attend to designing valid measures that are congruent with these 
conceptions.
Second, more methodological diversity and sophistication is 
needed in research on moral identity. With few exceptions, moral iden-
tity studies have been cross-sectional, and all have been nonexperi-
mental. In addition, most moral identity studies have involved small, 
non-representative samples, which limit the generalizability of their 
findings. Thus, longitudinal studies, and studies with larger, more di-
verse samples, can provide more information about causality, direction 
of influence, and the nature of relations between identity and moral-
ity among various populations. Even more, cross-cultural explorations 
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of moral identity are absent, but could prove invaluable in providing 
insight into the relative role of identity in morality. 
Third, applied research on moral identity is needed. Work on 
moral identity may have promising implications for moral education, 
youth development programs, and various interventions. Tradition-
ally such programs have not targeted promotion of positive or moral 
self-concept and identity, focusing instead on promoting one or two 
other components of morality, such as teaching moral values, or build-
ing empathic responding or moral reasoning abilities. There are ex-
ceptions, however, such as the service learning program explored by 
Youniss and Yates [1997], which promoted moral development, iden-
tity development, and aided youth in integrating moral commitment 
into their emerging sense of identity.  
Fourth, researchers should seek to draw from diverse literatures 
in understanding moral identity. For example, Lapsley and Narvaez 
[2004b] based their model on social-cognitive and information-pro-
cessing literatures, Reimer [2003] drew on cognitive neuroscience 
research, and Matsuba and Walker [2004] incorporated work in per-
sonality. The literature on self and identity is very rich in theory and 
empirical research but, as yet, moral identity scholars have not taken 
advantage of this literature. With the exception of Blasi [1983, 1984, 
1993, 1995], most moral identity researchers have focused more on 
the ‘moral’ side of the concept to the neglect of the ‘identity’ side. One 
example of an area of research that could inform moral identity re-
search is that on the multidimensional structure of self [Harter, 1999]. 
Moral identity models have emphasized the importance of morality 
to one’s global self-concept and identity. However, in recent years the 
trend has been towards thinking of the self as multidimensional [Har-
ter, 1999]. Thus, not only is there a global sense of self, but individuals 
also have selves specific to certain domains (e.g., peer relationships, 
school, jobs, and athletics). Moreover, Harter [1999] suggests that 
beginning in adolescence a domain specific self-concept may emerge 
for morality. Therefore, future research could explore the relevance 
of this work to research on moral identity. 
As research on moral identity expands through improved method-
ology and refined measurement, the strengths and limitations of cur-
rent thinking on moral identity will be further revealed. For example, 
further longitudinal studies may yield evidence of bidirectional rela-
tions between moral identity and moral action. Cross-cultural studies 
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may find that moral identity takes different forms in different cul-
tures, or plays an important moral role in some cultures but not oth-
ers. Studies comparing the relative influence on moral action of moral 
reasoning, moral emotion, and moral identity may find that the role 
of moral identity, comparatively, is less significant than anticipated. 
Continued examination of moral identity will likely result in the need 
to revise or dispense of existing models linking identity and morality. 
Conclusion 
To help us more fully understand moral functioning, and moral moti-
vation more specifically, Blasi [1983, 1984, 1993, 1995, 2001, 2004b, 
in press] and others [Arnold, 1993; Aquino & Reed, 2002; Bergman, 
2002; Carlo, in press; Colby & Damon, 1992; Eisenberg, 1986; Gibbs, 
2003; Hart, in press; Hoffman, 2000; Keller & Edelstein, 1993; Kohl-
berg & Candee, 1984; Krebs & Van Hesteren, 1994; Lapsley & Narvaez, 
2004b; Monroe, 2001; Moshman, 2005; Nisan, 2004; Nucci, 2001; 
Nunner-Winkler, 1998; Power & Kmhelkov, 1998; Pratt et al., 2003; 
Reimer & Wade-Stein, 2004; Rest, 1983; Schwartz & Howard, 1982; 
Walker, 2004; Youniss & Yates, 1997] have advocated a role for the 
self in morality. However, little empirical research has examined iden-
tity as a source of motivation for moral action and commitment, leav-
ing many conceptual notions of moral identity unexplored. Thus far, 
evidence suggests that individuals highly committed to moral causes 
seem to experience unity between their self and moral goals [Colby 
& Damon, 1992], and tend to more frequently use moral terms to de-
scribe their self than other individuals [Hart & Fegley, 1995; Reimer 
& Wade-Stein, 2004]. Further, the more individuals see moral virtues 
and values as important to their sense of self, the more likely they are 
to engage in moral behavior [Arnold, 1993; Aquino & Reed, 2002; Reed 
& Aquino, 2003; Pratt et al., 2003]. Hence, it seems connections do ex-
ist between the self and morality. However, questions of what consti-
tutes moral identity, and how and why it is linked to moral behavior 
and commitment (including questions regarding causal directional-
ity), remain unclear, and largely unexamined. Even more, some right-
fully remain skeptical of the relative importance of identity in com-
parison to other components of morality [e.g., Nucci, 2004; Turiel, 
2002]. Through conceptual refinement, and improved and expanded 
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research methodology, further understanding of the role and signifi-
cance of identity in moral functioning can be gained. 
It is hoped that this paper will stimulate dialogue regarding moral 
identity, provoke questions, and suggest possible avenues by which 
the field can move forward through conceptual and empirical investi-
gation of this intriguing concept. It seems an exciting new frontier is 
opening in moral psychology, where more consideration will be given 
to the role of identity in moral functioning. Although it is still a fledg-
ling research area, work on moral identity promises to move the field 
beyond predominant paradigms that have focused on certain dimen-
sions of morality (e.g., moral reasoning or moral emotion), and will 
urge scholars to think about moral functioning in a more complex, in-
tegrative, and holistic manner. Finally, moral identity theory and re-
search will help the field progress further in understanding what mo-
tivates and sustains moral behavior and commitment, an endeavor 
with important implications for moral psychology as well as society 
more broadly. 
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